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Perhaps the single most critical issue that Congress will have to face this
year is the need to make government more efficient, more effective and more
productive. It could prove to be one of the most difficult tasks any of us -
in Washington or out - has ever undertaken.
The task demands a diligent, unexciting scrutiny of the nuts and bolts
operations of the Congress and the Executive Branch.
From the perspective of the Congress, meeting that task will require
a much more careful examination of the federal programs it enacts into law.
We can no longer be satisfied with merely creating a program. We must alter the
way we operate so that we can keep each program, as it is implemented, under
our watchful eye. We must be prepared to adjust every program to meet changing
needs or eliminate it when the need for it goes away.
The Sunset Act of 1977 (S.2), which I introduced on January 10, 1977,
is in my judgment the best vehicle for Congress to apply this scrutiny to the
operations of federal programs. With the support of the Carter administration,
and broad-based, bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate, the bill has
.good prospects for enactment.
The principal operative mechanism of the bill forces nearly all federal
programs to be authorized, after a review, at least once every five years. 3 The bill
also includes a parallel, though not identical, procedure for tax expenditures.
Through this process, we can begin to close the gap between Congress and the
results of the programs it creates.
The principal enforcement mechanism in the bill is a legal prohibition
against funds being expended for a program which has not been specifically
reauthorized by Congress. S.2 would further make it out of order for either
House to consider a bill reauthorizing a program unless the appropriate legis-
lative committee had reviewed the program.
*United States Senator (D., Maine). Chairman, Senate Budget Committee. Chairman, Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. A.B., Bates College, 1936; LL.B.,
Cornell University, 1939; LL.D., University of Notre Dame, 1969.
This article was prepared prior to hearings on S. 2, conducted by the Senate Governmental Affairs Sub-
committee on Intergovernmental Relations. The hearings were held on March 22, 23, 24, 28, and 29, 1977.
1. S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see: 123 Cong. Rec. S. 144-50 (daily ed., Jan. 10, 1977).
2. At the time this article was written, S. 2 had 53 cosponsors, with 130 cosponsors of com-
panion legislation in the House of Representatives.
3. The sunset bill does not attempt to define "program," in recognition of the fact that no
single definition can satisfy all uses. However, S. 2 provides a process for developing a comprehensive list
of the programs of the federal government.
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In its simplest sense, sunset establishes nothing more than a process
through which Congress can begin to exercise greater control over the results of
the program it creates.
In its most far-reaching sense, sunset proposes nothing less than a revo-
lutiof in the way the Congress does business, by forcing improvements in the way
it judges government programs and the quality of services these programs provide.
By forcing elected representatives regularly to review and reauthorize
programs, sunset will make them publicly accountable for the operations of these
programs.
WHY SUNSET?
A number of factors have led me - and a majority of my Senate col-
leagues - to push for enactment of such a revolutionary idea as sunset.
First, it is not difficult for those of us in national office to see that our
people are not satisfied with the performance of their government.
Public opinion polls tell us that the American people have lost faith in
their government - that they do not think they are getting their money's worth
for their tax dollars -- that they do not believe government cares what they think
anymore.
In fact, this "confidence crisis" has been around for some time. Back in
1973, the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations contracted with the public opinion polling firm, Louis Harris and
Associates, Inc., to measure public perception of the responsiveness and effective-
ness of government.
In that survey, no more than 28% said they had a great deal of confidence
in any level of government, with local government rating the highest on the
confidence scale (28%) and the federal government rating the lowest (19%).
4
Even more striking was the study's finding that 67% believed that lack
of trust in government and 61% believed the inability of government to solve
problems were serious national problems. In fact, the public felt only high food
prices and corruption (at the height of Watergate) were more serious national
problems.i
More recent surveys by Harris and others have found similar results.
There are a number of reasons for this discontent. Some, like the divisive
experience of Vietnam and the trauma of scandal that led to the resignation of a
President and a Vice President, are clear enough. But underlying it all is what I
sense to be a pervasive feeling among the people that the government cannot per-
form even the simplest tasks very well. People see spending by government at all
levels increasing by leaps and bounds - they see inflation and higher taxes eating
up their paychecks - and they wonder what we are buying at this enormous cost.
The answer to their question is not easy. During the 1960's - which was
an extraordinary period of social progress and change in America'- we enacted
4. Hearings before the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations on Confidence and Concern, Citizens View America -. A Survey of Public Attitudes, 93rd Cong.,
Dec. 3, 1973, at 37, 38 [hereinafter cited as Hearings - Confidence and Concern].
5. Hearings - Confidence and Concern, supra note 4 at 50.
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hundreds of new government programs.
Today, as many of those programs are a decade old, we still do not have
a fundamental assessment of their performance.
Let me say that I voted for nearly every program Congress enacted during
the 1960's. But after every period of far-reaching government innovation, with
new ideas and initiatives, it is necessary to have a period where we step back,
assess what we have achieved and where we have gone wrong, and redirect and
strengthen our efforts to achieve our goals.
But despite all the pessimism about government today, I think there are
many reasons to be optimistic.
The great majority of Americans share a common aspiration - they want to
achieve human progress without needless waste and mismanagement. In many
ways, their lack of confidence comes not from government attempting to solve
human problems, but rather in not solving them well enough.
Even the Subcommittee's Harris survey gave substantial reason for opti-
mism. Eight out of every ten Americans said they are convinced that government
can work well. "The prescription of the American people themselves," Harris
said, "is for government to abandon policies of secrecy and open up a dialogue of
shared responsibility . . .between all levels of government and the people them-
selves." 6
So it is on this optimistic note - that with innovative approaches we can
improve the performance of our government and restore confidence in it - that
my colleagues have joined me in offering the sunset bill.
Sunset, after all, is not the first attempt by Congress to assert tighter con-
trol over federal spending. In 1974, Congress enacted the landmark Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 7 which many of us, including former
Senator Sam- J. Ervin, believe was the most important law passed by Congress
during our legislative lifetime. That bill arrested the trend that had existed for half
a century of Congress relinquishing control over the budget to the Executive
Branch, and restored to Congress its constitutional control over federal spending.
It has given the Congress the means to reassert its control over the federal budget
- the most important statement of national priorities that we have.
But for all its virtues, the new Congressional budget process also has its
limitations. The budget process alone is not self-executing: it is one thing to
establish spending priorities by establishing a series of spending ceilings in the
Congressional budget, quite another to implement these priorities in specific
program decisions. Unless we take a closer look at all the component parts of that
budget, the new congressional budget process could, in the not too distant future,
become little more than the arithmetic sum of predetermined spending levels.
During the last ten years, spending on so-called "uncontrollables" -
spending that is subject to little review or control by Congress, has increased from
59% to more than 75% of the federal budget.
According to Dr. Allen Schick of the Library of Congress, uncontrollable
spending is "bleeding" controllables. "If we compare the 1966 and 1976 budgets,
6. Hearings - Confidence and Concern, supra note 4 at 25.




we would find dozens of programs which were funded then, but aren't now,"
Dr. Schick states. "We would find dozens more which have grown less than in-
flation, and we would find dozens in which there is a growing and significant
gap between the amount authorized and the amount actually appropriated." 8
Moreover, programs with permanent appropriations, or funds spent
without any review by Congress, have become the fastest growing component
of the federal budget.
Programs with permanent authorizations have also proliferated. These
are programs enacted with provisions to authorize "such sums as may be nec-
essary" and which contain no termination date. Neither of these two program
categories undergo any regular review by the legislative committees of Congress.
Because of this predicament, which will only get worse in the future un-
less corrective action is taken, I have come to the conclusion that no matter how
successful the new budget process really is, the statement of national priorities
embodied in the federal budget will not be a genuine expression of legislative
policy until Congress has better control over the individual parts - the thousand
or more programs that make up the budget.
Until we can bring current activities - now costing more than $400
billion a year - under more effective control, we simply may not have the reserves
we need, either in the federal budget or in the public's trust, to pursue new
legislative solutions to pressing national problems.
The sunset approach embodied in S. 2 provides a sensible and responsible
procedure for appraising our use of scarce resources and redirects them to pro-
grams most in need.
A third factor that led to my support for sunset is the incredible prolif-
eration of federal programs that has occurred over the last decade and a half.
Besides putting a strain on the federal budget, the rapid growth of federal
programs over the last 15 years has resulted in a complex, cumbersome system.
The programs were designed to solve some truly serious national problems -
hunger, poverty, ignorance and disease. But today, the government system that
emerged with them is so unwieldy and unresponsive that many of the goals which
I have worked for and which those programs were intended to achieve are being
thwarted.
A recent General Accounting Office study of health clinics in the District
of Columbia illustrates this point. The study revealed that there were eight clinics
in one neighborhood in the District, funded under several different programs.
The administrators of the programs were obviously unaware of what each other
was doing. In several of these clinics, doctors were seeing only a handful of
patients a day while, in many parts of the country,the shortage of health care
is critical. 9
I do not know if this story is typical or not. I do know that as one who
has strongly supported an increased federal role in improving the quality of health
care available to all Americans, I am outraged by the waste this example demon-
strates.
8. Report of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Sept. 20, 1976,
at 30 (GPO Doc. 75-401).
9. General Accounting Office, Study of Programs for Health Services in Outpatient Health
Centers in District of Columbia, July 31, 1973 (GAO Doc. B-1 18638).
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I also know that the budget realities of today and tomorrow do not leave
room for wasting scarce resources. Our ability to establish national health insur-
ance will be compromised by wasteful and duplicative health programs.
Moreover, the fact that we do not know whether this story is typical or
not is a good indication of the predicament we are now in. We need to find out.
But we will not be able to find out with the business-as-usual practices of the
past.
The size and complexity of federal programs is illustrated in the 1976
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. The catalog lists 1,030 federal programs,
administered by 52 federal agencies.
In the health field alone, there are 302 different programs, administered
by 11 separate agencies. A total of 259 programs are listed under the category
of community development.
The multiplicity of federal programs becomes no less mind-boggling as
the program categories are narrowed. The catalog lists 39 different programs
under the Veterans category, with another 28 under the heading of Veterans
Medical Facilities and Services.
The category of Vocational Education has 27 programs listed, with
a reference to the Job Training subcategory of the Employment Labor and
Training category for more programs in the same area. Under the heading of
Transportation, 45 programs are listed.
A General Accounting Office study of the use of military maintenance
facilities found extensive duplication and underutilization of these facilities
because of the emphasis placed on developing separate rather than shared facili-
ties.
10
A study by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare found over
50 federal programs providing services to handicapped youth. The programs were
administered by 14 separate units within HEW. "
What do these numbers mean? They invite the obvious response of con-
solidating programs. Frankly, I do not think this is a sufficient remedy. I am
less concerned with the numbers than I am with the questions they raise: How
did we get to where we are today? What have we gotten in return?
The answer to the first question is relatively clear. We have arrived at our
present situation by enacting individual laws in piecemeal fashion. The fact that
we have 302 health programs may not necessarily be bad. What I am suggesting
is that we should have arrived at that number by design, not by default. If Con-
gress determines that we need all 302 health programs to best serve the public
need, then so be it. At least then we will have a positive, comprehensive state-
ment of federal health policy.
The answer to the second question is more difficult. Clearly, we have
provided health care to many Americans who were previously unable to afford it.
But we still have not cracked the fundamental problem of providing high quality
health care at a cost all Americans can afford.
10. General Accounting Office, Potential for Greater Consolidation of the Maintenance Workload
in the Military Services, July 6, 1973 (GAO Doc. B-178736).
11. General Accounting Office, Federal Programs for Education of the Handicapped: Issues and
Problems Dec. 5, 1974 (GAO Doc. B-164031(1)).
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There may have been a time when we could afford nearly a thousand
different legislative solutions to a few dozen national problems, when we did not
have to worry about which programs were working and which ones were not.
Today, we no longer have those options.
In my view, we have reached the point where government reform - the
more effective use of each tax dollar - is a social good in itself. For every dollar
that is wasted, either for health care or for fighter bombers, there is that much
less available to meet human needs.
This leads me to my final and most compelling reason for introducing
sunset legislation. No one really knows what we have bought through all of these
programs.
Over the past several years, there have been several legislative attempts to
organize the chaotic federal grant system. In 1968, Congress enacted the Inter-
governmental Cooperation Act, 12 which took several important steps to smooth
the administration of federal grants. Grant consolidation schemes have been
considered by both Houses on numerous occasions. In 1974, Congress enacted
the Joint Funding Simplification Act 13 in an attempt to cut red tape of appli-
cants for federal assistance. This year, we will again consider legislation Senators
Roth, Kennedy and I have introduced to make available to state and local of-
ficials a complete list of federal grant programs.
All of these are worthy legislative efforts. But they are all based on the
assumption that we have to take certain steps to make a complex, burdensome,
unwieldy government system a little more palatable. In other words, they seem
to accept the current system as inevitable and say, in essence, we need to put
bandages on its worst hurts.
THE SUNSET PROCESS
S. 2 is substantially the same as the Government Economy and Spending
Reform Act of 1976 (S. 2925), which I introduced on February 3, 197614- and
which was unanimously approved by the Senate Committee on Government Oper-
ations on May 4, 1976.
The principal provisions of the bill are as follows:
Title I sets out a five-year schedule for the mandatory review of all fed-
eral programs. Where no such authorization is enacted, no funds can be expended
to carry out the programs. The only exceptions to these provisions are interest on
the national debt, and programs into which individuals pay with the expectation
of later compensation - programs such as Social Security, railroad retirement, and
civil service retirement.
Title IV requires the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Committee on Finance to set out a similar schedule for the re-enactment of tax
expenditures.
12. Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4201 (1970).
13. Joint Funding Simplification Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4251 (1974).




Authorizations for federal programs are.grouped for reauthorization by
budget function and subfunction so that Congress will be forced to review all
programs in a given area during the same session, rather than in piecemeal fashion.
By requiring review by budget function, we have tried to insure that the potential
for duplication and overlap will be minimized, with the expectation that tax
dollars will be used more effectively.
Title II requires a thorough review of all programs by the appropriate
authorizing committee before they are reauthorized. As part of the review, au-
thorizing committees are required to explore the potential consequences of
cutting into the base of a program's funding, rather than simply reviewing in-
cremental funding increases, as is the practice now.
MAJOR CONCEPTUAL STRENGTHS OF THE SUNSET BILL
Congressional Commitment
I and other cosponsors of S. 2 have proposed a legislative initiative, as
embodied in the bill, rather than reliance solely upon administrative action,
because we believe there is a real need for congressional approval of and com-
mitment to such a process. We have seen with the early success of the new budget
process that a congressional commitment to this kind of reform is an essential
ingredient in making the reform work. Budget reform addressed a fundamental
congressional problem. S. 2 does the same.
Sunset can function in tandem with the zero base budgeting system
implemented by the Executive Branch. But zero base budgeting is no substitute
for sunset. Under our Constitution, only Congress enacts programs and appro-
priates funds for them. In order for program review to work, Congress has to be a
full and active participant in the process.
Linkage to the Authorization Process
Under the rules of the House and Senate, both an authorization and an
appropriation are generally needed to finance federal programs. In S. 2, the
sunset mechanism has been tied to the congressional authorization process for
two principal reasons.
In the first place, the authorization process is the principal means available
to Congress for making substantive federal policy. Since a fundamental purpose
of S. 2 is to force the regular review of congressionally determined policies as
implemented through federal programs, it is both appropriate and logical that the
process be tied to authorizations which are the responsibility of the legislative
committees of Congress.
Second, it is my opinion that certain trends in federal spending patterns
have weakened the authorization process and threaten to undermine recent
congressional efforts to reassert control over federal budget and spending policies.
These trends - which include the dramatic growth in programs with per-
manent appropriations - bode ill not only for the new congressional budget pro-
cess, but also for the all important role of Congress as the policy developing arm
of the federal government as well. S. 2 has been proposed, therefore, as a mechan-
ism for strengthening the authorization process and thereby bringing Congress




The fact that under S. 2 individual programs must justify their existence
or else not be reauthorized is the strongest incentive in the legislation for the new
process to be taken seriously - one which operates on both program managers
in the Executive Branch and on congressional supporters of particular programs.
S. 2 provides that no funds can be spent on any program which has not
been specifically reauthorized by Congress according to the review schedule. It
further requires that -a reauthorization measure will be out of order unless the
required "sunset" review by the authorizing committee has been completed.
These two provisions, taken together, are very strong incentives for all partici-
pants in the process to do the job well.
Review by Budget Function
Under the schedule set out in Title 1, programs are grouped by budget
function or subfunction. The purpose ofthis approach is to encourage the Con-
gress to examine the federal effort in an entire policy area - across the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of agencies and committees - rather than in an unrelated pro-
gram-by-program fashion in order to avoid conflicts or duplication between
programs.
Because the current classification of budget functions may need to be
changed from time to time, S. 2 provides for changes in the schedule to conform
to improvements and revisions in the categories of budget functions as they occur.
In reviewing programs by function or subfunction, Congress will be taking
a more comprehensive look at the broad policy area than it does now.
Neutrality of the Process
One of the major strengths in S. 2 lies in the absolute neutrality of the
process. That process does not attempt to judge the merits of any one program,
or of the priorities of federal spending as a whole. It only suggests that Congress
should arrive at the decision to maintain every federal program - military, foreign
or domestic - through positive action.
Through the process proposed in S. 2, Congress will have better infor-
mation with which to make the important policy decisions which go into deter-
mining those priorities.
MAJOR CHANGES
There have been some important modifications in S. 2, which have been
made in response to criticisms of S. 2925 by a number of Senators in the 94th
Congress.
The principal modification concerns the termination provision itself.
Section 101 (b) (1) of S. 2925 would have actually terminated provisions of
law - all provisions which authorize appropriations.
The corresponding section of S. 2 does not terminate provisions of law.
Rather, S. 2 states that no money can be expended or obligated without being
reauthorized by Congress. This change, although it has the same effect as the pro-
vision in S. 2925, leaves existing law untouched.
This modification was made to insure that in no case would substantive
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law be terminated. In the case of some older programs, a generic statute creating
an agency or department has served as its authorization. Therefore, it was dif-
ficult under the old version to make absolutely certain that the substantive
law in that generic statute was not terminated at the same time that the author-
ization was terminated. The version in S. 2 eliminates that problem because it
terminates no provision of law.
A second modification is the inclusion of a one-year grace period for
programs that terminate unintentionally rather than by design, either through
scheduling problems on the floor of the House or Senate or through a filibuster.
(See section 504 of S. 2.) In such a case, a privileged resolution would be in order
to extend the program for one year to allow the program to go through the review
and reauthorization process.
With this change, we believe we have responded adequately to the concerns
that there may be contingencies which we cannot now foresee when mandatory
reauthorization according to the schedule would not be possible.
The most controversial section of the last year's bill was in Title II, which
set out the requirements and guidelines for the authorizing committees to follow
in their review of programs scheduled for reauthorization. The requirements were
singled out as being too burdensome on the legislative committees.
In response to that criticism, we have substantially simplified the require-
ments, in effect reducing the review process from four steps to one. Reporting
requirements have been correspondingly reduced. In doing so, we have given
the authorizing committees more flexibility to set their own priorities and
methods for program review.
In addition, Title II of S. 2925 relied heavily on evaluation by executive
agencies. S. 2 leaves up to the authorizing committees how much they want to
rely on the agencies. With this modification, what we have now is clearly a con-
gressional bill.
We have retained without change the sunset provision, which is the prin-
cipal operative mechanism of the bill. Of all the provisions of the bill, it is the
sunset idea which garnered the broadest political support because it is totally
neutral and can therefore be supported by Members of Congress with diverse po-
litical views.
SUNSET AND ZERO BASE BUDGETING
A frequent misconception about the sunset bill is that it is also a zero
base budgeting bill. Confusion over this point results from the fact that the
original bill offered last year did combine the two concepts. However, hearings
on that bill convinced me and other principal, sponsors of the legislation that
while the two ideas are complementary, they address different problems.
Zero base budgeting is basically a management oriented tool which can
be used by a chief executive - in government or in private industry -- to analyze
and make budget decisions. It is a process which includes very specific steps
intended to give a chief executive more budget options than he might otherwise
have under an incremental budget approach.
There are undoubtedly many benefits to be gained from such a system.
In introducing the sunset legislation, however, it was our intention to propose a
19771
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congressional reform in the way Congress conducts its program review functions.
In this context, zero base budgeting is not the most appropriate tool. For while
zero base budgeting may assist the President in preparing his own budget, the
President's budget is not self-executing and it may not have any impact what-
soever on the Congressional authorization process.
Sunset, on the other hand, takes direct aim at that authorization process
- one which is, in reality, the principal driving force behind the federal budget.
Sunset and zero base budgeting both have as their ultimate purpose
the application of greater scrutiny to line-item budget decisions across the board.
Both challenge some basic assumptions about the normal, incremental budgeting
approach. But they address these purposes differently through equally important
perspectives - that of the President and the Executive Branch on the one hand,
and Congress on the other.
Thus, while they may be complementary, neither is an adequate sub-
stitute for the other.
S. 2 AND REGULATORY REFORM
Another misconception about sunset is its confusion with regulatory
reform. Although there is frequent confusion on this point, the sunset bill which
I have introduced is not a regulatory reform bill.
There are, however, other proposals before the Congress which would
apply the sunset concept to federal regulation, such as S. 600, the Regulatory
Reform Act of 1977, introduced by Senators Charles Percy and Robert Byrd. 15
Although S. 600 contains a "sunset" mechanism that would apply as a
last resort to regulatory agencies, the two bills are designed to address very
different problems.
S. 2 would terminate the authority to expand or obligate funds unless
a program is reauthorized. It would not terminate substantive provisions of
law - such as those guaranteeing rights or bestowing benefits - unless deliberately
intended by Congress.
Nor would S. 2 invalidate regulations previously promulgated under a
program or agency allowed to terminate.
S. 600 is intended to affect substantive regulation - statutory and ad-
ministrative. Under that legislation, the President would propose regulatory
reform plans according to a two-year schedule. It would limit the promulgation
or enforcement of regulations if Congress does not act on the reform measure in
time. And it would terminate regulatory agencies themselves as a final penalty for
the inaction. In other words, regulatory reform proposals have as a principal
purpose modifying or terminating substantive regulation.
The penalty for failure to act on programs under S. 2 is simply the termi-
nation of authority to expend or obligate funds for that program. Under S. 600,
the penalty for inaction on regulatory reform proposals is the termination of
substantive regulation - whether statutory or administrative.




We have deliberately devised a procedure which avoids automatic or
wholesale termination of provisions of substantive law. It would be unwise
under sunset to require the re-enactment of the United States Code every five
years, or engage in a periodic battle over the basic rights of Americans.
CONCERNS ABOUT THE SUNSET PROCESS
Thus far, the opposition to sunset legislation has been relatively diffuse
and indirect. To the extent that we have been able to detect it, there seem to be
three principal areas of concern.
Most commonly mentioned of these concerns has been the workload
question. 16 As I have noted earlier, this is a concern to which we have tried
to respond. In my opinion, the additional workload resulting from S. 2 will be
reasonable and manageable.
Another area of concern relates to the perceived impact of sunset on the
balance of power between Congress and the Executive Branch. Some critics of
sunset have argued that the process would actually strengthen the hand of the
President, by giving him the opportunity to block or veto the re-enactment
of larger numbers of programs than under current practice. Some have argued,
only half facetiously I suspect, that under sunset, the President would have the
opportunity to veto one-fifth of all federal programs every year.
The obvious flaw in this argument is that even today, an obstructionist
President could veto much of the federal budget - if Congress would let him get
away with it - by vetoing every appropriations measure.
Sunset would actually strengthen, not weaken, the policy-making arm
of Congress - both in the public relations sense of improving the credibility of
Congress' oversight efforts as well as in the substantive sense of bringing Congress
into closer touch with all the programs it has enacted over the years.
A final area of concern lies in the murky but volatile area of committee
prerogatives, and the perception that sunset might possibly impinge on them.
Here again, I do not find the concern justified.
To the extent that sunset does compel committees to meet certain dead-
lines which do not now exist, and to file certain reports which are not now
required, the process would impose new outside pressures on Congressional
committees. But beyond these procedural restrictions, the substantive preroga-
tives of the Congressional committees would remain untouched. Indeed, these
prerogatives should logically be strengthened, by improving the effectiveness of
the oversight efforts of the authorizing committees of Congress.
CONCLUSION
In an essay discussion about termination as a political process, Prof.
Robert Biller of the University of California's Graduate School of Public Policy
wrote: "[W] ith our primary dependence... on administered bureaucratic organi-
16. See: Hearings before Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on S. 2925, Sept. 8,
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), at 31, 33, 36 (GPO Doe. 76-182).
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zations, it is really unremarkable that we have come to assume a basic persistence
and perpetuity rather than termination to be used in dealing with most public
policies and organization." 17
Over the years, legislators have found the task of program review tedious
and unrewarding. Too many programs have been enacted on the assumption that
they would last forever.
As a result of our past attitudes, we find ourselves amidst a complex
system of programs and a maze of bureaucratic red tape. The federal budget
is being strained to support programs that no one knows for sure are working
properly, while leaving no room for new solutions to new national problems.
It is clear that Congress needs the action-forcing mechanism that sunset
provides to change its old habits and to assume its responsibility of making sure
the programs it creates are accomplishing their intended goals. It will provide
Congress with the incentive to undertake the responsibility it is not exercising
now, just as the new budget process has provided Congress with the incentive
to reassert its control over the federal budget.
The legislation I have introduced is not primarily a "termination" bill.
The sunset bill does not attempt to judge the worth of individual programs or
program areas. Rather, it provides Congress with the incentive to judge programs,
perhaps improve them along the way, or end them if they are no longer needed.
There is nothing now - in any legislation or in any rules of the Congress
or the Executive Branch - which prevents us from undertaking the kind of
program review that sunset mandates. But the responsibility is so scattered, and
the job so massive, that there has been no way to get started.
I think sunset provides that starting point.
As Bruce Adams of Common Cause writes, "Sunset could foster a stronger
legislative branch, overseeing a more accountable executive branch. If a lean,
strong government results, it could help restore public confidence and undercut
the anti-government feeling that is sweeping the nation today." 18
17. Biller, On Tolerating Policy and Organizational Termination: Some Design Considerations,
7 Policy Sciences 136 (June, 1976).
18. Adams, Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 Admin. L. Rev. 542 (1976).
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